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Many intriguing puzzles of today is due to our lack of knowledge on the
human behaviour. We are surprised how voters in a well-developed country can
be cheated and put to war by their president and appoint him again to the po-
sition; how another society brought up in the fine words of love of freedom rolls
from the eve of democracy down to authoritarianism; how an experienced politi-
cian deceived by the propaganda of his own advisers gets into a self-destruction
[1, 2, 3]. There is a continuous need to discover laws in social world. However,
even the tentative status of this target remains unclear [4, 5, 6]. A fundamental
disagreement lies at the heart of social science about whether social phenom-
ena can be subject to the same explanatory goals as physical phenomena [7].
Positivist, namely Emile Durkheim [8], claimed that the methods used to study
the social world did not differ in any important way from the methods used
to study the physical world. However, Max Weber [9] offered a serious empir-
ical alternative to positivism in the form of hermeneutics that held the view
there were crucial differences between the physical and social worlds. Thus, in
our discussion we put forward the questions. Can social research share, with
physical sciences, the goals of prediction and explanation? Are the social laws
different in nature from those of natural sciences? How universal they should
be? Do they allow for any predictions?
In these discussions, physics is quoted sometimes as a reference point [10].
Moreover, physicists are recently more and more involved in research on social
systems - the so-called sociophysics is a new branch of interdisciplinary studies
[11, 12]. As it is well known, the sociology started from the ’social physics’
and ’law of three stages’ [13]. Social research is a child of the scientific age.
As an investigative discipline, its origins are to be found in nineteenth century
model of physical science. Thus, empiricism may be defined as the idea that all
knowledge has its origins in experience that is derived through the senses. How-
ever, observation is not a straightforward affair for it contains two dimensions
which interact in complex ways. They are the cognitive and social dimensions.
Therefore, there is a constant relationship between theory and data. Today
the set of methods applied to investigate social systems cover a large area be-
tween philosophy, anthropology, economy, history, linguistics, psychology and
literature. Is there still any place for physics? In this text we show that once
physics is applied to a system described with many variables, the concept of law
becomes fuzzy. Our example is the second law of thermodynamics, which has
the long-lasting special status in physics.
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If any branch of physics can be applied to social systems, the statistical
mechanics seems to be first in the queue. It has a special status among other
branches of physics, because it deals with systems with as many as 1023 vari-
ables. It is obviously impossible to tackle so many data; then we limit the
description to two or three macroscopically measurable parameters, the others
are averaged out. The cost of this step is that the system dynamics reveals
new properties, which were absent in microscopic theories. Namely, for each
macroscopic state A there is some number N(A) of microscopic states, which
are qualified as A during the macroscopic measurement. As we know, the en-
tropy of the state A is defined as proportional to ln(N(A)). The problem is
that more than often we can distinguish ’disordered’ and ’ordered’ states, say
A and B, where N(A) is dramatically larger than N(B). Let us, then, prepare
the system in an initial state B - what will happen? The system spontaneously
evolves from B to A and will not return in time period shorter than, say, the age
of the Universe. This is the core of the irreversibility, of the entropy increase
and of the second law of thermodynamics, the subjects around which the dis-
cussion is still amusing [14]. But as we see, the effect of irreversibility appears
because our macroscopic measurements are inaccurate. Every microscopic state
α is unique and then, N(α) = 1. Then, the second law of thermodynamics is
a consequence of our way of doing measurements. Most philosophers of science
have argued that the method used is the only guarantee that the knowledge
obtained is scientific [15]. In this sense, science is method. Still some questions
remain. Is it objective? Is it a true inherent property of the Nature? or just a
consequence of our theoretical description?
In a purely macroscopic theory, i.e. the phenomenological thermodynamics,
we ignore not only the information on the values of the internal variables, but
also their mere existence. An example of the state A is the state of a metallic
rod, both ends of the same temperature. This state happens as a natural con-
sequence of a specially prepared state B, when one end is heated and another
end is yet cold. The process of heat flow is irreversible, macroscopically mea-
surable and real. If we are able to follow the time evolution of the microscopic
variables, i.e. the coordinates and velocities of atoms in the rod, the trajectory
of the system would drive it from one microscopic state to another. In this case
there is no need to introduce entropy; if one does so, he finds that it is equal
to zero and it does not vary in time. The second law of thermodynamic is then
entangled with our axioms.
Maybe we should add that the second law of thermodynamics is at the root
of our understanding of physics. As it was sarcastically formulated by Arthur
Eddington, the famous astrophysicist: If someone points out to you that your
pet theory of the universe is in disagreement with Maxwell’s equations then so
much the worse for Maxwell’s equations. If it is found to be contradicted by ob-
servation well, these experimentalists do bungle things sometimes. But if your
theory is found to be against the second law of thermodynamics I can give you
no hope; there is nothing for it but to collapse in deepest humiliation. [14]. This
example of the second law of thermodynamics teaches us that a theory is ac-
cepted if it reflects the results of our measurements. As such, it depends on
the measurement method. By employing the correct method, the scientist may
be sure that their findings are true, repeatable and generalizable. These logical
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attempts to build a justificatory framework for scientific knowledge were ruined
in social sciences by Karl Popper [16]. According to him a scientific theory, as
opposed to a pseudoscientific theory, is one open to falsification. If the theory
passes the tests, it is not confirmed, it only meant that it was not falsified on
that occasion. By eliminating untruth through the falsification process, science
moves closer to the truth. The question if the theory is true drives us too far.
The same law, although so atypical in physics, provides a bridge to other
sciences. Let us take into account that infinite sources of heat do not exist:
every one will run out after some time. More engines work at the source, more
active is the heat flow, sooner the source gets cold; when it is colder, the effi-
ciency of engines working between the source and the environment decreases.
In describing an engine as inefficient the engineer has recourse to an agreed
specification of efficiency for a given engine. If a social scientist described the
workforce of a factory as inefficient, it is unlikely that there would be agreement
over such characterization. Karl Poppers definition of facts may be one way
around this difficulty. According to him, facts are something like a common
product of language and reality [17]. What we see as factual is a product of our
theories and an agreement between them and reality itself. Back to efficiency,
similar rule is known in economy as the law of diminishing returns [18]. This
argument works without a reference to individual engines or individual enter-
prises. Obviously, we can use it without making attempts to ’understand’ the
souls of the businessmen. From the microscopic point of view the state when
there is something to gain in the market is rare; in an ideal market as in the
equilibrium state there is nothing to gain - there is no heat flow. Once how-
ever a source of income appears, more and more agents use it and fortwith the
source is empty. The same law seems to apply to any other systems, including
those most complex, as the society. As there is much more disordered than or-
dered states, the disorder increases, regardless of the definition of disorder itself.
The question by far more important is if the second law will be qualified as
useful by the sociologists. There are at least two reasons for the negative answer.
First is the assumption of the second law, which states that the system should
be isolated. In economical and social sciences, this assumption always remains
disputable. Second difficulty is that in a social system there are many recognized
and unrecognized processes which run with different velocities and therefore one
could argue that the state of equilibrium is never attained. At the end we have
to notice that in the physical sciences, unlike in social sciences, there is a desire
for something stronger than predictions that are quite likely to be accurate. Sci-
ence requires invariable laws of nature in order that our predictions about the
escape velocity of space shuttles do not end in disaster. To the contrary we can
find many social scientist who are of the opinion that social researchers are not
in business of predicting or explaining at all [19]. Because not only is the social
world more complex than physical world, but it is of completely different nature.
Still, the argument on the entropy increase has at least one ready application
to the problem well established in sociology: the racial segregation problem as
discussed by Thomas Schelling [20]. There is only one state with perfect order,
where two communities live in two separated areas. Once we allow for some
disorder, where the communities mix at least slightly, the number of possible
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states abruptly increases. In other words, the states with spaial mixing of the
communities are much more probable, than the states where the communities
are strictly separated. This is the origin of a diffusion of members of one com-
munity to the area of the other and vice versa. Actually, the same mechanism
operates at the n-p junction. Recent computer simulations of the problem set by
Schelling were thoroughly described in Ref. [21]. In physics, the quantity which
controls the amount of disorder is temperature. However, as it was pointed out
in [21], disorder is absent in the Schelling’s formulation. Once temperature is
zero, the tendency to order must prevail. After Schelling himself in 2005 [22]: A
very small preference not to have too many people unlike you in the neighbour-
hood, or even merely a preference for some people like you in the neighbourhood
could lead to such very drastic equilibrium results that looked very much like
extreme separation. In physics, it is only at states of equilibrium where tem-
perature makes sense. Again, there is no direct equivalent of temperature in
sociology. The authors of Ref. [21] refer to two indirect ones: ’tolerance’ as
indifference and ’trouble’ as external conditions other than the preference of
this or that community.
In 2007, Dietrich Stauffer gave a talk in Cracow about the Schelling model
[20, 21] for a humanistically oriented audience. Having finished, he got a ques-
tion: ’What can you say about motivations of those people who move from
their flats to change neighbors?’ The answer was: ’Nothing’. The problem of
communication between physics and sociology is that the above thermodynamic
formulation does not provide any new perspective for a social scientist. For a
sociophysicist, the keywords for the race segregation problem are lattice the-
ory and diffusion [21], with temperature and entropy as the background. For
a sociologist, the keywords could be tolerance, status and prejudice. As it was
stated by Robert K. Merton, a sociological theory is a logically interconnected
set of propositions from which empirical regularities can be derived [10]. He
also pointed out that there are both internal and external accounts of science
and both appear to be necessary to its practice. But even if we could divide the
methodological decisions of science into rational and the social, we would be left
with the problem of how real some phenomena actually are, because empirical
regularities about prejudices or tolerance are hard to be derived from entropy
or temperature. According to recent formulations in theory of science, an ad-
vance can be achieved if the new theory can answer or evade more questions
on an investigated subject, than the old one [23], unless we maintain Thomas
Kuhn position, that progress comes only through revolutions [24]. Then, the
sociophysicist should be able to solve problems on social status with the second
law of thermodynamics. This task is still before us. Both for the sociology
and the sociophysics, the subject is the same - the society. Sometimes even the
empiricistic paradigm is the same. The barrier between these sciences comes
not only from the vocabulary and the method applied, but also from different
aspects of the social subject which are of interest for the researchers.
To conclude, it seems that in the near future the sociophysics will not unify
with the sociology, but rather it will develop in parallel. The area when the
overlap if these sciences is most close seems to be an analysis of large sets of
data where the statistical tools work well. In such analysis, the description of
a single object is necessarily reduced to a simple characteristics. This approach
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is well in spirit of the statistical physics. On the other hand, in recent decades
physics has become concerned with objects that cannot be directly experienced
by the senses. These phenomena can only be known through the means by
which they are recorded or reasoned from indirect evidence. Indeed, it might be
argued that their very nature is the product of theoretical description. However
scientific theories are not simply social products with a discrete existence, but
social products with complex and possibly diverse origins. It seems that the
nature of the barriers between the sciences is mainly historical. If the physics
itself appears to be not less subjective than the social sciences, why do not apply
it to the society?
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